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.S. L ewis' concern for the abuse of animals in scientific
experimentation, as treated in That Hideous Strength,
will be fam iliar to many readers of this journal. W hat some
readers will not be so sure about though, I suspect, will be
the proposition that this concern of Lewis' can be seen to
owe a great deal to his in terest in evolutionary theory. It is
my in tention in this article to substantiate this proposition,
utilizing both Lewis' writing and that of authors to whom
he acknowledges an intellectual debt. I will also refer to
some of the m ore recent scholarship on Lewis and the
views of som e other w riters concerning vivisection.

q

In That Hideous Strength, the third volum e in Lewis'
science fiction trilogy, readers will know, the N.I.C.E. —
the National Institute of Co-ordinated Experiments —
were engaged in "a n immense programme of vivisection,
freed at last from Red Tape and from niggling econom y"
(THS, 102). M ark Studdock became aware of this when he
happened to wander into the vicinity of some new build
ings at the back of the Belbury mansion, from which
em anated "a m ixture of animal and chemical sm ells":
As he stood there a loud melancholy howl arose and
then, as if it had set the key, all manner of trumpetings,
baying, screams, laughter even, which shuddered and
protested for a moment and then died away into mutterings and moans.... There were all sorts of things in
there: thousands of pounds worth of living animality,
which the Institute could afford to cut up like paper on
the mere chance of some interesting discovery (THS,
102,162).
Interestingly, it is precisely this last point — experimenta
tion on animals simply out of curiosity, or perhaps primar
ily to satisfy the self-serving interests of experimenters —
that animal welfare groups such as the RSPCA (Royal
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) currently
find most objectionable, as was expressed last year by Dr.
Hugh W orth, President of the RSPCA in Victoria, Australia:
[Worth says] the RSPCA draws the line at pure
research, the "w hat if? stuff," w here procedures are
carried out without definite conclusions: "W e im 
mediately clash with pure scientists or those psy
chologists, who are worse, designing these little
experiments that have no obvious end point, no
obvious expected retrieval of information.... All
these clowns get all sorts of Ph.D. titles. You wonder
why they even w ant to do it. It's all bulldust stuff."1
As an example of the kind of thing Lewis perhaps had
in mind in his day, one could cite Lancelot Hogben's
Science for the Citizen, originally published in the 1940s,
which, in a section titled "T he Conquest of Behaviour,"

describes experiments w hich can be carried out on various
species to dem onstrate "reactivity." Thus "suitable stimu
lation" of the "anal orifice.... by a succession of electric
shocks" will cause changes in a cham eleon's coloration;
snipping the spinal cord with a pair of dissecting scissors,
however, will result in the anim al only show ing these
changes in the part of the body posterior to the cu t (extraor
dinary!). This experim ent is described as an illustration of
what is involved in "controlling" an anim al.2 The philos
ophy of Science for the Citizen is neatly sum marized in the
opening paragraph of a chapter toward the end of the book
titled "A Planned Ecology o f H um an L ife":
Evolution unfolds a new horizon of human destiny.
Man has it in his power to become an active and intel
ligent directive agent in the evolutionary process, using
his knowledge of the diversity of living creatures to
decide which are essential to his own welfare as objects
of use... and using his knowledge of the properties of
living matter to adjust the environment of the species
he chooses as members of a rationally planned ecolog
ical system.3
All this sounds very like Lord Feverstone's explanation of
the N.I.C.E/S objectives to M ark Studdock:
The second problem is our rivals on this planet. I don't
mean only insects and bacteria. There's far too much
life of every kind about, animal and vegetable. We
haven't really cleared the place yet. First we couldn't;
and then we had aesthetic and humanitarian scruples;
and we still haven't short-circuited the question of the
balance of nature. All that is to be gone into (THS, 42).
Or, as neatly encapsulated in C o sse ts rem ark to Studdock
as they arrived at the village of C ure H ardy for C esser's
(for whom "statistics about agricultural labourers were the
substance; any real ditcher, ploughm an, or farm er's boy
the shadow ") sociological investigations: "Bloody awful
noise those birds m ake" (THS, 87).
Yet, as I've indicated, it can be argued that it was Lewis'
interest in evolution that can partly account for his objec
tions to animal experimentation. H ow can this be?
To begin with, a w idely held m isconception about
Lewis — repeated, unfortunately, in A.N. W ilson's recent
biography — needs to be dispelled; and that is the notion
that Lewis, once he becam e a Christian, rejected evolution.
In his essay "T he Funeral o f a G reat M yth," w ritten about
1945 (that is, a number of years after his conversion to
Christianity), Lewis says quite unambiguously:
I do not mean that the doctrine of Evolution as held by
practising biologists is a myth. It may be shown by
later biologists to be a less satisfying hypothesis than
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we hoped fifty years ago. But that does not amount to
being a Myth. It is a genuine scientific hypothesis. But
we must sharply distinguish between Evolution as a
biological theorem and popular Evolutionism or
Developmentalism, which is certainly a Myth (CR, 83).
By "E volutionism ," Lew is goes on to explain, he m eant not
a scientific theory b ut a philosophical position, as repre
sented in the w ritings of H enri B ergson for example, and
which held that the cosm os w as in evitably m oving "o n
wards and upw ards" to som e kind o f perfect state — an
idea that no evolutionary scientist w ould subscribe to.
(There is no certain d irection in D arw inian evolution, en
vironm ental changes are ju st as random and unpredictable
as the genetic m utations w hich have been favored by
them; degeneracy" can be a feature o f b iological change
just as increasing com plexity — in the Tielhardian sense
— can be.) Lew is goes on to say:
Popular evolutionism or Developmentalism differs in
content [Lewis' emphasis] from the Evolution of real
biologists. To the biologist Evolution is a hypothesis at
present on the market and is therefore to be accepted
unless, or until, some new supposal can be shown to
cover still more facts with even fewer assumptions
(CR, 85).
That is about as adm irable a sum m ary of the currently
m ost widely accepted w orking philosophy of science —
that o f Sir Karl Popper — as one could wish for: the idea
that any scientific theory is always open to question in the
light of new evidence, and no genuine scientist interested
in such m atters (w hich o f course is by no m eans all) would
ask for m ore. A gain, in "M od ern M an and his C ategories
o f T h o u g h t," w r itte n in 1 9 4 6 , L e w is sa y s: "W ith
D arwinianism as the theorem in Biology I do not think a
Christian need have any q u arrel" (PC, 63).
Som eone as intelligent as Lew is, and with the wide
interests he had, could not b ut help take the findings of
science seriously. Th at he was interested in science is evi
dent enough not on ly in the know ledge of science he
displays in his science fiction trilogy (as well as in such
collections of essays as O f This and Other Worlds and Present
Concerns), but it is also apparent in the num erous refer
ences that Lew is m akes to his scientific reading in his now
published Diary and Letters, and also in Surprised by Joy. A s
one of Lew is' biographers, A.N. W ilson, quotes W illiam
Epsom , w ho knew Lew is, Lew is was one who "read ev
erything and rem em bered everything he read."4 Among
the authors w hose works Lew is indicated he had read
were D arw in and the o ther N ineteenth-century scientists
T.H. H uxley, W illiam Clifford and Sir John Lobbock (SBJ,
43; Letters, 227), Sir Jam es Frazer (The Golden Bough — an
anthropological w ork [Diary, 351]), S.H. Rivers (Instincts
and the Unconscious, which Lewis read with "g reat interest"
[Diary, 67], J.B.S. H aldane (CR, 85), and L.T. Hobhouse,
author of Mind in Evolution, and who Lewis described in
1926 as "a m an after m y ow n heart" (Diary, 354). Lewis was
also, of course, very aware of the second-hand versions of science
in writers like Wells, Beigson, and to a lesser extent, Shaw.
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But Lew is did not ju st read books. If there was one thing
he enjoyed even m ore than sitting around in a sm oke-filled
pub with his brother W am ie, it was ram bling in the sur
rounding countryside. M oreover he was a keen and care
ful observer of nature. A n entry in his Diary for 27 June
1923, for instance, reads:
I walked nearly to Dorset Hill by the field path and
then turned into the road and left it again at the stile
on my right beyond the turn to Forest Hill.... then up
by the side of a spinney through a field alive with
rabbits, most of them mere babies who let me get quite
close to them. Of the full grown ones I was amused to
notice how some would always sit out and face me a
good minute after the commonality had galloped into
the spinney.... (Diary, 248).
There is good evidence, too, that these observations were
through D arwinian spectacles. In 1925, during a ram ble on
Exm oor with M aureen M oore (who w as a child at the time,
living with her m other and Lew is) Lew is recorded the
following:
We.... struck left till we reached a green gully about
four feet deep and running quite straight down the
hillside. After a few yards descent it developed, as I
had expected, into a stream, where we picked our way
from stone to stone laboriously. We found plenty of
frog spawn and some red mosses...
Maureen, apropos of something, asked me if the evo
lutionary theory meant that we had come from monkeys.
I explained what it really meant. She asked me where
Adam and Eve came in. I explained the Biblical and
scientific accounts were alternatives. She asked me which
I believed. I said the scientific (Diary, 361).
And that this interest in science, nature and evolution
was not restricted to his pre-C hristian period (i.e. pre-1929)
is clear also from, for exam ple, a letter he wrote to Dom
Bede G riffiths in 1952:
By the way do read K.Z. Lorenz [sic] King Solomon's
Ring on animal — especially b ird — behaviour. There
are instincts I never dreamed of: big with promise of
real morality. The wolf is a v. different creature from
what we imagine (Letters, 422).
In C.S. Lewis: A Biography, A N . W ilson writes at one
point that the "crude D arw inian view of hum an conscious
ness.... was that it had som ehow or o th er" evolved "from
a succession of increasingly intelligent apes, beginning
with a creature who little thought beyond where his next
banana was com ing from, and culm inating in the Presi
d ent of the Royal Society," and that "T his was only a
theory and not, on the face o f it, a particularly probable
on e."5 W ilson im plies that Lewis w ould have rejected any
such idea out of hand (presented in this caricature form he
very likely would have), b ut W ilson now here cites Lewis
in w riting as definitely having done so, and as w e will see,
Lewis remained at least equivocal on the subject. More
than this, it was Lewis' in terest in the evolution of con
sciousness, specifically, that partly explains his strong feel
ings about experim entation w ith animals. To see how this
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was so, it is w orth looking for a m oment at this book, King
Solomon's Ring, that Lewis com mended to Bede Griffiths.
W hat Lewis is referring to in wolves is presumably
those qualities o f co-operative behavior and mutual assis
tance in the pack that Lorenz describes in some detail
(albeit in populist, anthropomorphic language):
In the life of a wolf, the community of the pack plays a
vastly more important role than in that of the jackal.
While the latter is essentially a solitary hunter and con
fines himself to a limited territory, the wolf packs roam
far and wide through the forests of the North as a sworn
and very exclusive band which sticks together through
thick and thin and whose members will defend each
other to the very death.6
Although Lorenz does not fully spell out a Darwinian
explanation for this kind of behavior in the volume in
question (he does so elsewhere7), Lewis was certainly
aware of such an explanation, as will be demonstrated
shortly in another extract from That Hideous Strength. An
explanation is provided by H obhouse — the author Lewis
described as "as m an after my ow n heart" — in Mind in

Evolution:
The higher animals lead a social life, not only in the sense
that they congregate together like swarms of gnats or
shoals of fish, but in the sense that they have sotial or
family relations with one another. In these relations, acts
of mutual help or forbearance are involved, and it is out
of acts of mutual help and forbearance that morality as
we know it among men is built up.8
W hat H obhouse is saying, first of all, is that such
behaviors w ould be selected for (in natural selection terms)
in so far as they increased the survival prospects of the
group (e.g. a w olf pack) as a whole. A social species whose
m embers cam e to one another's aid (or distracted attention
from vulnerable m em bers of the group, such as juveniles,
as Lewis observed w ith the rabbits) would be at an advan
tage in the struggle for existence. Such behavior, in turn,
H obhouse argued, probably depends upon feelings of
"affinity " for other members of a troop, pack or whatever,
and it is these feelings (or instincts) which lay at the basis
of moral b ehav ior— concern for the welfare of our fellows
— in humans. Hobhouse goes on to express this concept
in Mind in Evolution in these terms:
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so easily m ade the quantum leap from these species to
humans that H obhouse m akes is quite another matter; one
would surely have to say probably not (especially when
one considers Lewis' discussion of "instinct" in The Aboli
tion of Man [24-6]). There is a vast difference between
hum an reasoning capacity and that of any other species
we know of that the traditional separation of the "hum an
ities" from natural science is, at least in terms of our
present state of knowledge, fully justified, as A llan Bloom
has so forcefully argued. N evertheless, there have been
variously cogent attem pts to incorporate hum an reason
into naturalistic explanations, and o f these perhaps the
m ost persuasive have been those of Charles D arw in him
self. In a chapter on "T he M oral Sense" in The Descent of
Man, Darwin discusses the concept of the evolution of
human m orality from the social instincts of 'Tower" (from
the Victorian scala natura idea) anim als; but w here his
discussion differs from H obhouse's is in the much greater
place that Darwin allows for the role of hum an reason.
Darwin w rites as follows:
The social animals which stand at the bottom of the
scale are guided almost exclusively, and those which
stand higher in the scale are largely guided, by special
instincts in the aid which they give to the members of
the same community; but they are likewise in part
impelled by mutual love and sympathy, assisted appar
ently by some amount of reason. Although man.... has
no special instincts to tell him how to aid his fellow men,
he still has the impulse, and with his improved intellec
tual faculties would naturally be much guided in this
respect by reason and experience [my emphasis]."11
Furthermore, for Darwin, it is our reason that makes it
possible for our natural, instinctive feelings of "sym pathy"
towards members o f our ow n im m ediate social groups to
be extended towards ever-w idening groups o f our own
species, and ultim ately tow ard other species:

What is clear is that in following out these instincts the
animal is acting as part of a whole, as a member of a
species. He is stimulated by his affinity to another
individual, and his actions are of service to individuals
that come after him.... Human morality rests on the
same fundamental conditions at a higher stage of de
velopment. Our common human nature is the ultimate
basis of moral conceptions.9

As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are
united into larger communities, the simplest reason
would tell each individual that he ought to extend his
social instincts and sympathies to all members of the
same nation, though personally unknown to him. This
point being once reached, there is only an artificial
barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men
of all nations and races....
Sympathy beyond the confines of man, this is human
ity to the lower animals, seems to be one of the latest moral
acquisitions [the RSPCA and Anti-Vivisectionist Society
had only been recently founded in England at Darwin's
timeing of writing]... This virtue, one of the noblest with
which man is endowed, seems to arrive incidentally from
our sympathies becoming more tender and more widely
diffused, until they are extended to all sentient beings.

H obhouse's idea that such instincts lie at the basis of
human morality sound very much like Lewis' remark to
Dom Bede Griffiths about certain instincts in social
animals like wolves and som e birds being "big with a
promise of real m orality." But whether Lewis would have

Here, then, is a powerful argum ent upon w hich Lewis
could base his case for objection to anim al experimenta
tion: the fact that other anim als are in som e sense like us,
and are therefore at least entitled to our sym pathies on that
account — an argum ent based on reason as much as
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feeling, b ut in which fellow -feeling, a product of evolution,
nevertheless plays a m ajor part.
This last elem ent, the evolutionary factor w hich ex
presses itself in "sy m pathy ," and to which Hobhouse con
siders the origins of hum an m orality can be traced, may
also be som etim es visible, according to Darwin, in non
human anim als exhibiting these feelings tow ards m embers
of other than their ow n species. In his chapter on "T he
Moral Sen se," D arw in h as this story:
Several years ago a keeper at the Zoological Gardens
showed me some deep and scarcely healed wounds on
the nape of his own neck, inflicted on him, whilst
kneeling on the floor, by a fierce baboon. The little
American monkey, who was a warm friend of the
keeper, lived in the same large compartment, and was
dreadfully afraid of the great baboon. Nevertheless, as
soon as he saw his friend in peril, he rushed to the
rescue, and by screams and bites so distracted the
baboon that the man was able to escape, after, as the
surgeon thought, running great risk to his life.13
D a rw in 's s to r y w a s e n t h u s ia s tic a lly re p e a te d by
Hobhouse, and also by Rev. Charles Kingsley, author of
The Water Babies ("on the strength of that sam e elem ent of
self-sacrifice, I will not grudge the epithet 'heroic', which
my reverend friend Mr. D arw in justly applied to [that]
poor little m onkey"14), and it is fair to assum e that Lewis
would have read it in at least one of these authors (we
know he read Kingsley [Letters, 504]), if not in Darwin. But
there is good reason to think that Lewis also read the story
first-hand in Darwin. O n the sam e page in Descent of Man
on which he has the story, D arwin also says: "I have m yself
seen a dog, who never passed a cat who lay sick in a basket,
and was a great friend of his, w ithout giving her a few licks
with his tongue, the surest sign of kind feeling in a d og ."1
This sounds som ething like the follow ing episode in That
Hideous Strength, where Lewis describes the relationship
of Mr. Bultitude and Pinch:
'What friends those two are!' said Ivy Maggs. She was
referring to Pinch the cat and Mr. Bultitude the bear.
The latter was sitting up with his back against the
warm wall by the kitchen fire....
The cat, after walking to and fro with erect tail and
rubbing herself against his belly, had finally curled up
and gone to sleep between his legs....
'When we use the word, Friends, of those two
creatures', said MacPhee, 1 doubt we are being merely
anthropomorphic. It is difficult to avoid the illusion that
they have personalities in the human sense. But there's no
evidence for it'....
What do you think, Sir?' said Ivy, looking at the
Director.
'Me?' said Ransom. 1 think MacPhee is introducing
into animal life a distinction that doesn't exist there, and
then trying to determine on which side of that distinction
the feeling of Pinch and Bultitude fall. You've got to
become human before the physical cravings are distin
guishable from affections.... What is going on in the cat
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and the bear isn't one or other of those two things: it is a
single undifferentiated thing in which you can find the
germ of what we call friendship and of what we call
physical need' (THS, 260-1).
This "germ of what we call friendship" is presumingly
meant in some kind of evolutionary sense, and it is easy to
see how Lewis could conceive of this being connected with
the question of kindliness of one species toward another the
very antithesis of self-centeredness, and surely having some
thing to do with morality. The role o f feeling, of sentiment,
in the repugnance that Lewis felt towards animal experimen
tation was well expressed in his Diary, where he recorded
how his Aunt Lily, an anti-vivisectionist (who was also
interested in Mendelian theory), in November 1922
Told me a very disgusting story of how medical stu
dents here in Oxford, who she had seen dragging off
a dog into the laboratories [and who] were laughing
together as they talked of the old man who had sold it
making them promise to give it a good home and be
kind to it (Diary, 143).
Lewis added, presum ably at a later date: "after that I no
longer defended Oxford again or ever sh all."
But the im portance o f reasoned argum ent — o f which
humans, unlike other species, are also capable — in our
relationship with the other creatures was also recognized
by Lewis. And it is interesting to see that Lew is based such
argum ents on a D arwinian understanding o f the relative
developm ent of "consciou sness" in various species also,
especially in his essay "V ivisection" and in the chapter
"Anim al Pain" in The Problem o f Pain — both written long
after Lewis' conversion to Christianity. Kath Film er has
recently argued that the consistency of them es and im ages
in Lewis' work reveals no m arked change or repudiation
by the later Lewis of his early world view, and she
specifically takes this back to his O xford student years.
However this may be in other areas of Lew is' thinking, it
would certainly seem to apply in his attitude toward evo
lution. W hatever his Christian convictions in the matter,
Lewis' objections to anim al suffering at the hands of hu
mans were at least reinforced by persuasive evolutionary
arguments, as is clear in this passage from The Problem of

Pain:
Clearly in some way the ape and man are much more
like each other that either is like a worm. At the lower
end of the animal realm we need not assume anything
we could not recognize as sentience. Biologists in dis
tinguishing animal from vegetable do not make use of
sentience or locomotion or other such characteristics
as a layman would naturally fix upon. At some point,
however (though where, we cannot say), sentience
almost certainly comes in, for the high animals have
nervous systems very like our own (PP, 119).
And Lewis did n otbalk at taking such observations to their
logical conclusion:
It is certainly difficult to suppose that the apes, the
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elephant, and the higher domestic animals have not, in
some degree, a self or soul which connects experiences
and gives rise to rudimentary individuality (PP, 121).
D arw in's scala natura idea strongly informs both these
excerpts: animals "higher" in the scale o f being are more
like us, and therefore presum ably more likely to feel pain
in som ething approaching the way w e do. The same con
cept lies behind Lewis' account, in Perelandra, of Ransom's
discovery of a frog-like creature that had been mutilated
by the depraved scientist, Professor Weston:
The thing itself was an intolerable obscenity. It
would have been better, or so he thought at the
moment, for the whole universe never to have
existed than for this one thing to have happened.
Then he decided, in spite of his theoretical belief
that it was an organism too low for much pain, that
it better be killed. He had neither boots nor stone
nor stick. The frog proved remarkably hard to kill.
W hen it was far too late to desist he saw clearly that
he had been a fool to make the attempt. W hatever
its sufferings m ight be he had to go through with
it. The job seemed to take nearly an hour. And
when at last the mangled result was quite still and
he went dow n to the water's edge to w ash, he was
sick and shaken (Perelandra, 109).
So, if non-human animals feel pain something like we
do because they have nervous systems like ours, and this
is because they are related to us in the evolutionary sense,
then it is only reasonable that we should consider their
feelings just as we believe we should consider the feelings
of other humans in accordance with the Golden Rule —
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.17 As
the case was admirably p ut in a recent letter to New Scien
tist in connection with an on-going debate in that journal
on animal experimentation:
An ethics based on kinship with other animals as
sumes nothing more than the unemotional, rational
realization than many species suffer pain. If it was
wrong to inflict pain on humans whatever their mental
abilities, then it must be wrong to inflict pain on non
human animals."18
This was p recisely the argum en t used by Lewis in
"Vivisection":
The very same people who will most contemptuously
brush aside any consideration of animal suffering if it
stands in the way of 'research' will also, in another
context, most vehemently deny that there is any rad
ical difference between man and the other animals....
If we cut up beasts simply because they cannot prevent
us and because we are backing our own side in the
struggle for existence, it is only logical to cut up imbe
ciles, criminals, enemies.... for the same reasons (GTD,
226-7).
If it is wrong to experiment on the latter, so it is with the
former.

Lewis was not anti-science. As I have tried to show, it
can be argued that it was partly his in terest in science
which accounts for his objection to anim al experimenta
tion. Michael Aeschliman has argued that for Lewis nature
was "both real and good ,"19 and indeed, in That Hideous
Strength Lewis, as narrator, reassures readers that "the
physical sciences" w ere both "good and innocent in them
selves" (THS, 203). Science, ideally, is m otivated by a love
of truth, and about this Lewis could have had no com
plaint. Trouble enters in how ever w hen, as Kathryn
Lindskoog and Gracia Fay Ellwood so well explain,
science becomes m erely a tool in the hands of self-serving
practitioners m otivated prim arily by love of power.20 To
Lewis such a misuse is a distortion of truth, a perversion
of (as Aeschliman puts it) "T he elem entary 'natural'
tendency w ith which every hum an creature [is] endowed
— to live happily and considerately — happily because
considerately — in com m unity w ith is fellows. 1 But the
last word on the subject should b e by Lewis:
The regenerate science which I have in mind would
not do even to minerals and vegetables what modem
science threatens to do to man himself. When it ex
plained it would not explain away. When it spoke of
the parts it would remember the whole. While study
ing the It it would remember what Martin Buber calls
the TTiow-situation. The analogy between the Tao of
Man and the instincts of an animal species would mean
for it new light cast on the unknown thing. Instinct, by
the only known reality of conscience (AOM, 47).
Sfe
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Joe Christopher has called me to note that 1993 is the 100th
anniversary of the birth of Dorothy L. Sayers. He suggests
that there be a special issue of Mythlore later in 1993 to honor
her. Due to her friendship with the Inklings and the affinity
of her world-view with theirs, I would be most pleased to
see such an issue, featuring several articles in her honor, pro
vided they are submitted. — Glen GoodKnight
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